金融危机的两个变体正继续蹂躏着西方经济，令失业和贫穷状况进一步加剧：一个是我们经常在报纸上读到的涉及各国政府的金融危机；另一个不那么起眼的则是中小型企业和家庭层面上的危机。在这两种危机得到恰当应对之前，西方世界将继续背负着增长滞缓、失业率长期居高及收入与财富差距过大的负担。

　　主权债务危机是众所周知的。为了避免出现经济萧条，各国政府在全球金融危机期间都忙于实施财政及货币刺激政策。此举成功抵消了因私营部门去杠杆化所导致的严重经济紊乱，但却是以破坏自身财政收支平衡以及扰乱央行资产负债表为代价的。

　　虽然主权信贷的质量几乎全面恶化——并很可能继续恶化下去——但它对各国的影响却有所不同。某些西方国家——比如希腊——起初其政府账目就非常糟糕，所以很快就陷入了长期持续性的危机模式。这些国家将一直深陷危机，即便很长一段时期之后都依然无法为其公民带来一丝希望。

　　其他国家过去在财政上一直尽职尽责，却无力应对那些从别处承担的债务（例如那些不可靠的爱尔兰银行就毁了本国的预算）。另外一些国家——包括美国——没有受到直接的威胁，但无法在某些长期事务上取得进展。而有几个像德国这样的国家则通过多年的财政纪律和体制改革拥有了深厚的经济和金融复原能力。

　　各国的应对政策各不相同，这也并不奇怪。但事实上，这些政策之间只拥有一个至关重要（也令人失望）的共同点：那就是无法依靠经济快速增长这个“最安全”的方法来为其过度负债的经济去杠杆化。

　　希腊实际上已经在某些债务上出现了违约。爱尔兰和英国一样选择了紧缩政策和改革。美国正逐步通过金融抑制手段把资源从债权人转移到债务人手上。而德国正逐渐适应在国内需求方面的稳健相对扩张。

　　关于主权债务危机我想说的就这么多，因为考虑到其对国家、区域及全球的影响，对其的讨论已经足够丰富了。毕竟，它之所以被称之为主权，就是因为它们拥有征税、监管，甚至极端点说，没收的权力。

　　另外一种信贷危机也同样重要，但其受到的关注却少得多，即使它损坏了社会的凝聚力、生产力以及人们维持自身生活水平的能力（尤其是对底层人群来说）。据我所知，绝大部分西方国家的中小企业、中等收入以及收入拮据的家庭都经历过信贷获取渠道显著下降——不仅针对新的融资，还包括更新过往信贷额度和借款的能力。

　　这种信贷危机产生的直接原因大家都知道。其范围涵盖从银行抑制贷款到异常的高风险规避行为、从信贷工具信誉崩溃再到某些机构完全撤出信用中介机构的举措。

　　这种信贷约束是许多国家失业率持续上升的一个原因——通常这些国家的失业率原本已经处于令人担忧的水平了，例如希腊和西班牙25%的失业率（这两个国家的青年失业率已经超过了50%）——同时也是像美国这样的国家失业率居高不下的原因（虽然相对而言美国的失业率并不高）。这不仅仅是生产力流失和贫困加剧的问题；长期的高失业率还会导致社会动荡、对本国政治领导人的不信任以及产生失落一代的风险。

　　确实，许多发达国家的失业数据主要由长期失业构成（通常定义为六个月或以上）。技能的逐渐丧失对那些原本有工作经验的人来说是个问题，而首次就业不成功则不仅意味着失业这么简单，还隐含着不会被雇佣的风险。

　　政府们在处理私人信贷危机上做得太少了。虽然理论上它们必先解决危机中的主权债务方面；然而目前尚不清楚大部分官员是否制订了一个全面计划。

　　那些受到主权债务危机影响最剧烈的国家的政策非对称性最为明显。在这些国家，政府基本上任由私营部门自生自灭；大部分家庭和企业都处在挣扎之中，因此加剧了长期的经济崩溃。

　　其他国家则仿佛采取了一种“寻梦之地”——也被称之为“平台建好了，人就来了”——的方法来处理私人信贷市场，例如，在美国，由于美联储的政策措施，人为降低了对住房抵押贷款的利率，以期启动审慎的融资。欧洲央行也正在采取这么一个间接手段。

　　但在这两个地方，掌握有更有力工具的其他政策制定实体似乎既不愿意也无力承担自己的角色。在这种情况下，央行的行动将一直无法产生足够的牵引力。

　　事实上，只有英国明确选择了更协调也更直接的方式来抵消由私人信贷危机引起的长期短缺。由英国格兰银行和财政部共同设计的“贷款资助方案”旨在“提高银行和建房互助协会向英国家庭和非金融企业借贷的动力”，同时也要求前者为自身的行为负责。

　　英国的例子很重要；但是考虑到整个挑战所涉及的范围和规模 ，该提案还是相对保守的。这一计划也许能刺激一些有益的信用中介行为，但它依然无法对那些继续阻碍强劲经济复苏的因素产生重大影响。

　　生产部门能够拥有适当的信贷获取渠道对一个运转良好的经济体来说至关重要。否则经济增长就将止步不前，也无法充分创造就业，不断扩大的财富与收入差距将腐蚀整个社会结构。这就是为什么任何恢复发达国家经济和金融活力的综合性手段都必须着眼于适当复苏私人信贷流的原因。

 

Mohamed A. El-Erian:The Other Financial Crisis

　　穆罕默德•埃利安是美国大型债券经纪公司太平洋投资管理有限公司(PIMCO)首席执行官兼联席首席投资官，著有《当市场冲突之时》一书　

By Mohamed A. El-Erian

NEWPORT BEACH - Two variants of financial crisis continue to wreak havoc on Western economies, fueling joblessness and poverty: the one that we read about regularly in newspapers, involving governments around the world; and a less visible one at the level of small and medium-size businesses and households. Until both are addressed properly, the West will remain burdened by sluggish growth, persistently high unemployment, and excessive income and wealth inequality.

The sovereign-debt crisis is well known. In order to avert a likely depression, governments around the world engaged in fiscal and monetary stimulus in the midst of the global financial crisis. They succeeded in offsetting nasty economic dislocations caused by private-sector deleveraging, but at the cost of encumbering their fiscal balances and their central banks' balance sheets.

While sovereign credit quality has deteriorated virtually across the board, and will most probably continue to do so, the implications for individual countries vary. Some Western countries - such as Greece - had fragile government accounts from the outset and tipped quickly into persistent crisis mode. There they remain, still failing to provide citizens with a light at the end of what already has been a long tunnel.

Other countries had been fiscally responsible, but were overwhelmed by the liabilities that they had assumed from others (for example, Ireland's irresponsible banks sank their budget). Still others, including the United States, faced no immediate threat but failed to make progress on longer-term issues. A few, like Germany, had built deep economic and financial resilience through years of fiscal discipline and structural reforms.

It is not surprising that policy approaches have also varied. Indeed, they have shared only one, albeit crucial (and disappointing) feature: the inability to rely on rapid growth as the "safest" way to deleverage an over-indebted economy.

Greece essentially defaulted on some obligations. Ireland opted for austerity and reforms, as has the United Kingdom. The US is gradually transferring resources from creditors to debtors through financial repression. And Germany is slowly acquiescing to a prudent relative expansion in domestic demand.

So much for the sovereign-debt crisis, which, given its national, regional, and global impact, has been particularly well covered. After all, sovereigns are called that because they have the power to impose taxes, regulations, and, at the extreme, confiscation.

But the other credit crisis is equally consequential, and receives much less attention, even as it erodes societies' integrity, productive capabilities, and ability to maintain living standards (particularly for the least fortunate). I know of very few Western countries where small and medium-size companies, as well as middle-income households and those of more limited means, have not experienced a significant decline in their access to credit - not just new financing, but also the ability to roll over old credit lines and loans.

The immediate causes are well known. They range from subdued bank lending to unusually high risk aversion, and from discredited credit vehicles to the withdrawal of some institutions from credit intermediation altogether.

Such credit constraints are one reason why unemployment rates continue to rise in so many countries - often from already alarming levels, such as 25% in Greece and Spain (where youth unemployment is above 50%) - and why unemployment remains unusually high in countries like the US (albeit it at a much lower level). This is not just a matter of lost capabilities and rising poverty; persistently high unemployment also leads to social unrest, erosion of trust in political leaders and institutions, and the mounting risk of a lost generation.

Indeed, unemployment data in many advanced countries are dominated by long-term joblessness (usually defined as six months or more). Skill erosion becomes a problem for those with prior work experience, while unsuccessful first-time entrants into the labor force are not just unemployed, but risk becoming unemployable.

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