马德里——太平洋还是中东？这是美国当前面临的首要战略问题。美国总统奥巴马在金边会见亚洲领导人时加沙发生暴力事件是对美国两难困境的完美诠释。奥巴马非但无法关注亚洲这个美国外交政策的“支点”，反而被迫在与埃及和以色列领导人的谈判中耗费大量时间，并指派国务卿希拉里•克林顿离开亚洲，以便促成在加沙地区达成停火协议。

　　上述两个吸引美国关注的地缘政治焦点中，一个代表未来、另一个则代表过去。尽管亚洲在美国总统竞选中发挥了重要作用，中国的崛起问题被反复提及，但美国数十年来一直深陷于中东问题。除永恒不变的巴以冲突外，伊拉克的混乱局势、阿拉伯之春、叙利亚内战和伊朗目前的核僵局都吸引着美国的注意力。

　　如果伊朗危机失控，美国的外交重点将不再是亚洲问题。但如果能以外交手段解决和伊朗的争端，中东问题或许可能像奥巴马总统明确期望的那样转移到不那么重要的位置。因此问题在于美国是否会在对中东能源依赖度日益降低的同时被该地区爆发的另一场战争所波及。

　　事实上，根据国际能源机构的近期预测，打破常规的碳氢化合物（特别是页岩油气）革命到2020年将使美国成为世界最大产油国，而到2030年则将成为最大产能国，由此产生的全球反响将不容小觑。对美国而言，能源自给是分阶段从中东撤军的完美借口；一旦摆脱对能源的依赖，美国就可以集中精力处理太平洋事务。

　　尽管保持全球能源价格稳定和与以色列联盟的需要意味着美国无法从中东烦恼中彻底脱身， 但战略重点向亚洲的转移早在奥巴马的首届任期内已经开始，克林顿甚至早在美国从伊拉克撤军前就宣布了美国战略重点的转移。竞选连任后，奥巴马的首次国外访问选择了缅甸、泰国和柬埔寨——中国不可能喜欢这样的选择，因为上述三国均为东盟成员，而缅甸直到开始民主过渡前一直是中国的亲密盟友。

　　当然，亚洲经济飞速发展，但需要依靠地区安全机制和经济一体化来控制该地区剑拔弩张的民族紧张局势。美国学者李侃如和北京大学国际研究院院长王缉思近期在一篇布鲁金斯学会论文中指出，“战略不信任”已进一步恶化了本已复杂的局势。

　　国际体系和谐运转的基础将取决于能否培养二十一世纪大国之间的战略互信。但上述目标怎样才能实现？因为到2020年中国石油进口量的四分之三将来源于中东，一个重要的步骤是争取中国的合作以解决该地区的问题。

　　2013年1月以色列大选后，伊朗将再次成为奥巴马外交政策议程中的首要问题。对伊朗实施军事干预可能引发地区、乃至全球动荡，伊朗国内将于6月举行总统选举。阿拉伯世界、俄罗斯和中国将被迫表明立场，导致全球处在权力两极的大国间关系紧张，并加剧太平洋地区的紧张局势。因此同美国合作避免决一胜负完全符合中国的战略利益。

　　除伊朗问题外，迫切需要稳定整个中东地区的动荡局势。哈马斯和以色列之间最新爆发的暴力冲突凸显了恢复和平进程的重要性。导致越来越多地区力量卷入其中的叙利亚内战已经越来越像是（沙特阿拉伯及其他海湾国家、土耳其、埃及的）逊尼派穆斯林和（伊朗及真主党的）什叶派穆斯林之间为争夺区域霸权发动全面战争的试验场。

　　伊朗领导人似乎深信美国在承受了十余年战争所带来的极高的经济及人员损失后，更愿意尽力避免另一次军事行动。这种看法在美国舆论中似乎也得到了印证。芝加哥全球事务理事会近来的一次调查表明，67%的美国人认为伊拉克战争得不偿失。此外，69%的人认为美国在阿富汗战争后面临的恐怖主义威胁并未减弱，而71%的人表示伊拉克的经验表明美国应该更加谨慎地使用武力。

　　但即便美国人似乎不愿为又一次没有出路的国外冒险投资数十亿美元，伊朗领导人却越来越深地陷入破坏该国经济的国际制裁的包围。双方也许认为至少从目前的情况看，谈判才是他们最好的选择。

　　和平解决伊朗问题将帮助美国完成向亚洲的过渡。中国可能不希望看到这样的结果，但它在中东能源供应安全领域的切身利益迫使它不得不合作。毕竟，再次爆发中东冲突将在未来几十年中毒害和扭曲该地区关系，而对美中两国而言，这将是可能出现的最坏结果。

　　翻译：Xu Binbin

　　哈维尔•索拉纳，北约前秘书长及欧盟共同外交和安全政策高级代表，现为布鲁金斯学会著名高级研究员及ESADE全球经济和地缘政治中心主席　
 

Javier Solana:America's Perilous Pivot  

By Javier Solana

MADRID - The Pacific or the Middle East? For the United States, that is now the primary strategic question. The violence in Gaza, coming as President Barack Obama was meeting Asia's leaders in Phnom Penh, perfectly encapsulates America's dilemma. Instead of being able to focus on US foreign policy's "pivot" to Asia, Obama was forced to spend many hours in conversation with the leaders of Egypt and Israel, and to dispatch Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from Asia, in order to facilitate a cease-fire in Gaza.

Of the two geopolitical focal points demanding America's attention, one represents the future and the other the past. Whereas Asia played an important role in a US presidential election campaign that was marked by often-heated references to China's rise, the Middle East has kept the US bogged down for decades. In addition to the eternal Israel-Palestine conflict, Iraq's instability, the Arab Spring, Syria's civil war, and the ongoing nuclear standoff with Iran all demand America's attention.

If the Iran crisis were to boil over, the pivot to Asia would no longer be America's main foreign-policy priority. But if the dispute with Iran is resolved diplomatically, the Middle East might, perhaps, be relegated to a position of lesser importance, as Obama clearly desires. The question, therefore, is whether the US will find itself drawn into another war in a region on which it depends less and less for energy.

Indeed, the revolution in non-conventional hydrocarbons, particularly shale gas and oil, which the International Energy Agency recently predicted would make the US the world's largest oil producer by 2020, and the top energy producer overall by 2030, will have enormous global repercussions. For the US, energy self-sufficiency is the perfect excuse for a phased withdrawal from the Middle East; freed from energy dependency, America should be able to concentrate on the Pacific.

Although maintaining stable global energy prices and its alliance with Israel means that the US cannot cut itself off completely from the Middle East's troubles, the shift in focus to Asia began early in Obama's first administration, with Clinton announcing America's strategic reorientation even before US troops began withdrawing from Iraq. Following his re-election, Obama's first foreign visit was to Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia - a choice that cannot have pleased China, as all three are ASEAN members, while Myanmar was, until it began its democratic transition, a close Chinese ally.

Asia is, of course, experiencing rapid economic growth, but managing the region's strong nationalist tensions calls for the creation of regional security structures, together with closer economic integration. Complicating matters even more is what US scholar Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, the dean of international studies at Peking University, called in a recent paper for the Brookings Institution "strategic distrust."

Cultivating strategic trust between the twenty-first century's leading powers will be fundamental to the international system's harmonious functioning. But how can this be achieved? As China will be importing three-quarters of its oil from the Middle East by 2020, one step forward would be China's cooperation in finding solutions to the region's problems.

After the January 2013 Israeli elections, Iran will again move to the top of Obama's foreign-policy agenda. Military intervention in Iran - which itself will be holding a presidential election in June - would incite not only regional, but global, instability. The Arab world, Russia, and China would be forced to take sides, straining global relations between the different poles of power and raising tensions in the Pacific. So China has a large strategic interest in working with the US to avoid a showdown.

Beyond Iran, the volatile situation throughout the Middle East urgently demands solutions. The latest eruption of violent conflict between Hamas and Israel underscores the importance of reviving the peace process. Syria's civil war, in which a growing number of regional players have become involved, is beginning to look increasingly like a trial run for all-out war between Sunni Muslims (Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, Turkey, and Egypt) and Shia Muslims (Iran and Hezbollah) for regional dominance.

Iran's leaders appear to believe that the US, having incurred extremely high economic and human costs from more than a decade of war, would rather avoid another military intervention. US public opinion seems to confirm this. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs indicated that 67% of Americans believe that the Iraq war was not worthwhile. Moreover, 69% do not believe that the US is safer from terrorism since the war in Afghanistan, and 71% say that the experience in Iraq shows that the US should take greater care in how it uses force.

But, if Americans seem unlikely to be willing to invest billions of dollars in another dead-end foreign adventure, Iran's leaders, for their part, are increasingly hemmed in by international sanctions, which are beginning to wreak havoc on the country's economy. Both sides may believe that their best option - at least for now - is to negotiate.

Peaceful resolution of the Iranian question would help the US to complete its shift toward Asia. China may not wish for that outcome, but its own vital interest in the security of Middle East energy supplies should compel it to cooperate. After all, another Middle East conflict would poison and distort relations in the region for decades, which would be the worst of all possible consequences - for the US and China alike.

Javier Solana, former Secretary-General of NATO and EU High  Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and President of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics.

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