北京天译时代翻译培训公司整理了“奈梅特·沙菲克介绍当前全球经济问题的解决方案”，希望对译员们从事翻译工作有所帮助。
　　Smart Governance: Solutions for Today’s Global Economy
　　智能治理：当前全球经济问题的解决方案
　　By Nemat Shafik
　　Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
　　Oxford, United Kingdom
　　基金组织副总裁奈梅特·沙菲克
　　英国伦敦
　　Good afternoon! I am so pleased to be here with you today, where I spent very happy years earning my DPhil in economics. This is a magical place, full of beauty and clever people. My only regret is that I left too soon.
　　大家下午好！很高兴今天在这里与各位见面。我曾在这里度过非常快乐的时光，并获得经济学博士学位。这是一个神奇之地，这里的人们美丽而聪慧。唯一的遗憾是，我太早离开了这里。
　　Fortunately, my good friends Ngaire Woods and Max Watson have invited me to return to give the Annual Global Economic Governance Lecture. Let me outline the main points I plan to make today.
　　幸运的是，我的好朋友 Ngaire Woods 和 Max Watson 邀请我重回故地，就年度全球经济治理问题座谈。我想概括地说一下今天打算谈的要点。
　　Making the case for smart governance
　　为什么需要智能治理
　　Global economic crises tend to reignite discussions of global governance and international cooperation. The recent crisis has been no different. This is because crises lay bare the shortcomings of existing international rules and institutions.
　　全球经济危机往往会引发新一轮全球治理和国际合作问题的讨论。最近的危机也不例外。这是因为危机让现有国际规则和制度的缺陷暴露无遗。
　　We have seen how weaknesses and failures in banks and capital markets can spread through the international financial system. The same is true for other challenges faced by the world today, whether we are talking about climate change, nuclear weapons proliferation, or health pandemics. What happens anywhere affects everybody—and increasingly so.
　　我们已经看到银行和资本市场的缺陷如何可以通过国际金融体系蔓延。当今世界面临的其他挑战也是如此，不论是气候变化、核武器扩散、或流行性疾病。任何地方发生的事情会影响到每一个人，而且日益如此。
　　So it is pretty clear that the world needs more, not less, international coordination and cooperation. But how to achieve this goal? In a recent article, the FT’s Martin Wolf discussed the importance of global public goods and how to provide them.
　　因此，很明显，世界需要更多而不是更少的国际协调和合作。但是，如何才能实现这一目标呢？金融时报的 Martin Wolf 在最近一篇文章中讨论了全球公共产品的重要性，以及如何提供这些产品。
　　“The states on which humanity depends to provide these goods, from security to management of climate, are unpopular, overstretched and at odds. We need to think about how to manage such a world. It is going to take extraordinary creativity.”
　　“人类提供这些产品（从安全到气候管理）所依赖的规则不受人欢迎、过分紧张且不一致。我们需要思考如何管理这样一个世界。这要求有非凡的创造性”。
　　Martin is right. We need to be creative if we want to make progress. We need smart governance if we want solutions that work for today’s global economy.
　　Martin 是对的。如果要取得进展，我们必须有创造性。如果想找出今天全球经济问题的解决方案，我们需要有智能治理。
　　I would like to focus today on three related topics. First, I will briefly touch upon the historical relationship between crises on the one hand, and governance reforms and policy coordination on the other hand. Second, I will discuss the response in terms of governance reforms and policy coordination that we have seen in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. Finally, I will close my talk by sharing with you some reflections on how global economic governance might evolve going forward—how “smart governance” may provide the right balance between flexibility and effectiveness that the world needs to manage globalization.
　　今天我想集中谈三个相关主题。首先，一方面，简要谈谈历次危机之间的历史关系，另一方面，治理改革和政策协调。还将讨论 2008 年金融危机之后采取的治理改革和政策协调。最后，与大家分享我对未来全球经济治理可能如何演变的想法，“智能治理”如何可以在“灵活性”和“有效性”之间取得合理的平衡，这两“性”是我们管理全球化所不可或缺的。
　　A world in transition
　　转轨中的世界
　　The global economy is in transition. Global economic power is shifting from west, to east and south. Emerging and developing economies already make up more than 50 percent of global GDP (on a PPP basis)—ten years from now this number is expected to increase to 64 percent.
　　全球经济正处在转轨之中。全球经济力量正在从西方向东方和南方转移。新兴市场和发展中经济体占全球 GDP 的比重已经超过 50%（按购买力平价计算），再过十年，预计此比重将提高到 64%。
　　At the same time, trade and financial linkages have risen spectacularly. Cross-border bank claims grew from $6 to over $30 trillion between 1990 and 2008, and global merchandise exports of goods and services increased from $4 trillion to $20 trillion. While these numbers contracted somewhat in subsequent years due to the global crisis, the growth rates for the past 20 or 30 years are still impressive.
　　同时，贸易和金融联系大幅度增加。1990 年至 2008 年之间，跨境银行债权从 6 万亿美元上升到 30 万亿美元以上，全球货物和服务出口从 4 万亿美元增至 20 万亿美元。虽然这些数字在随后的几年由于全球金融危机有所收缩，但是，过去 20 年或 30 年的增长率仍然非同寻常。
　　On the production side, global supply chains have become the norm rather than the exception. A typical manufacturing company today relies on inputs from more than 35 different contractors from around the world—for some companies, such as car and airplane manufacturers, this number can range in the tens of thousands.
　　在生产方面，全球供应链已经成为一种常态，而不是例外。如今一个典型的制造企业的投入品由世界各地 35 个以上的合同商提供。有一些公司，如汽车和飞机制造商，所依赖的合同商可能数以万计。
　　With the sharp increase in interconnectedness and the growing diffusion of economic power, it would have been reasonable to expect a simultaneous transformation and expansion of global governance. In theory, demand for global governance should have increased with rising levels of global integration in order to manage the rules of the game and reduce negative spillover effects.
　　随着相互关联性日益提高和经济实力日益扩散，全球治理同时发生转变和扩充是预料之中。从理论上讲，随着全球一体化程度提高，对全球治理的需求也会增加，从而更好地管理游戏规则，减少负面溢出效应。
　　But as we all know, global governance issues were on the backburner in the run-up to the financial crisis. Indeed, against the background of high growth and low output volatility—what has been called “the Great Moderation”—observers even wondered whether global governance was a concept of the past, and institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO superfluous.
　　但是，正如各位所知，至到金融危机发生，全球治理问题从未引起足够的重视。事实上，在高增长和低产出波动（被称为“平稳增长”）的背景下，观察人员甚至怀疑全球治理是否过时，一些机构如基金组织、世界银行和世界贸易组织是否多余。
　　Only in 2008, when a disruption in a relatively small segment of the U.S. financial system spilled into distant markets and countries, and morphed into a full-fledged global financial crisis, it became clear that there had been an undersupply of global governance in the years leading up to the crisis.
　　到 2008 年，美国金融系统的小部分出现问题，遥远的市场和国家都受到波及，并演变成了一场全面的全球金融危机，很明显，在危机发生之前的几年里，全球治理是不充分的。
　　Crises as opportunity
　　危机同时也提供了机遇
　　Five years after the onslaught of the global financial crisis, economic governance remains at the center of the policy debate. I would argue that this is no surprise, given that, historically, there has been a symbiotic relationship between crises and the evolution of governance.
　　全球金融危机冲击过后五年，经济治理一直是政策辩论的中心。我认为，这毫不奇怪，因为，从历史来看，在危机和治理演变之间存在一种共生关系。
　　Granted, governance is often seen as evolving slowly and in an incremental manner and at a stately pace, while crises are intrinsically disruptive and revolutionary. However, as history has repeatedly shown, crisis often bring out the shortcomings of existing governance arrangements, while the fear of recurrence can galvanize support for reform.
　　诚然，治理通常以缓慢、渐进和严肃的方式演变，而危机在本质上是破坏性和革命性的。然而，历史一再证明，危机往往会暴露治理安排的缺陷，而对危机复发的担心可以激发对改革的支持。
　　For instance, in the wake of World War I, the League of Nations was created to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security, while experiences of hyperinflation in the 1920s motivated efforts to restore the gold standard. Similarly, the Great Depression and World War II triggered much of our current architecture of global governance, with the creation of the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now the World Trade Organization. The traumatic experience of World War II also provided impetus for political and economic integration in Europe.
　例如，在第一次世界大战之后，成立了国际联盟，以促进国际合作，实现国际和平和安全，而 20 世纪 20 年代发生的恶性通胀推动了恢复金本位制的努力。同样，大萧条和第二次世界大战促使了目前全球治理架构大部分内容的出台、以及联合国、基金组织、世界银行和关贸总协定和贸易（现在的世界贸易组织）的创建。二战的惨痛经历也为实现欧洲政治和经济一体化提供了动力。
　　In the United States, the financial crisis of 1907 paved the way for the creation of the Federal Reserve, while the bitter experience of the Great Depression led to a major overhaul of financial regulation, with the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, which separated commercial and investment banking, and remained in place for more than sixty years. More recently, the regional currency swap arrangements among ASEAN members known as Chiang Mai Initiative were created in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
　　在美国， 1907 年的金融危机为创建美联储铺平了道路，大萧条的痛苦经历导致对金融监管进行重大改革，以及在 1933 年通过格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案，让商业银行与投资银行业务分离，这种分离保持了 60 多年。亚洲危机之后，东盟成员国之间建立了区域货币互换安排（被称为清迈倡议）。
　　As with similar situations in the past, the global financial crisis of 2008 imposed large costs and hardship on affected countries. However, from a perspective of economic governance, it has also provided a window of opportunity to advance reforms and strengthen policy coordination. Did we manage to not let a good crisis go to waste? (a quote associated with Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s former Chief of Staff, but like all great quotes was said by Churchill first). Let me provide a brief overview of what we have achieved in the past five years before looking at the gaps that remain.
　　与以往情况类似，2008 年的全球金融危机给受创国造成巨大的成本和困难。然而，从经济治理的角度看，它也为推进改革和加强政策协调提供了一个机会窗口。我们能让危机白白发生吗？（引述奥巴马总统前办公厅主任 Rahm Emanuel 的话，但是，与所有伟大格言都有更早出处一样，这句话最早是丘吉尔说的）。首先让我总结一下在过去五年所取得的成绩，然后看看还存在些差距。
　　A mixed score card
　　好坏参半的成绩单
　　The efforts in governance reform since the crisis can be broadly split into three categories—coordinating macroeconomic policies, fixing global financial regulation, and strengthening regional and global safety nets.
　　危机以来的治理改革工作大致可分为三类：协调宏观经济政策、修复全球金融监管和加强区域和全球安全网。
　　First, macroeconomic policy coordination. Although not perfect, such coordination was particularly strong at the initial stage of the crisis. For instance, six major central banks announced, in an unprecedented move, a coordinated cut in policy rates in October 2008 to ease global economic conditions. The U.S Federal Reserve and 14 different monetary authorities established temporary U.S. currency swap arrangements to mitigate dollar shortages in short-term funding markets. And the first ever G20 Leaders’ Summit was convened in November 2008 and led to a commitment to coordinated fiscal stimulus and a pledge to refrain from protectionism.
　　首先，宏观经济政策协调。虽然不尽完善，但这种协调在危机初始阶段特别有力。例如，六大央行以前所未有的方式宣布将在 2008 年协调降息，以纾缓全球经济。美国联邦储备委员会和 14 个货币当局设立了临时美元货币互换安排，以缓解短期融资市场上的美元短缺。2008 年 11 月，20 国集团领导人召开首次峰会，承诺协调实施财政刺激，杜绝保护主义。
　　These massive efforts meant that, instead of another Great Depression, we got the Great Recession, which actually is a significant achievement, given the possible counterfactuals. However, more recently, the momentum for policy coordination has slowed, as the focus has shifted from preventing a calamity to avoiding future crises and supporting the nascent recovery. Some have argued that while the G20 was good in war, it might not be able to deliver as much in peace time.
　　这些大规模努力的结果是，没有再次发生大萧条，而是出现大衰退，这实际上是一个巨大成就，因为实际结果可能会更糟糕。然而，最近，政策协调的势头有所减缓，因为重点已经从预防灾难转变为避免未来发生危机和支持复苏。有人认为，20 国集团可以在战争时期较好合作，但在和平时期则不尽然。
　　And the task is far from over.
　　任务还远未结束。
　　One challenge faced by the international community going forward will be to continue the dialogue on unwinding unconventional monetary policies and managing potential spillover effects as well as managing our way out of the debt burdens accumulated during the crisis.
　　国际社会未来面临的一大挑战是继续就退出非常规货币政策、管理潜在的溢出效应和处理危机期间累积的债务负担进行对话。
　　Second, global financial regulation. To address the origins of the crisis, G20 members committed to a fundamental overhaul of global financial regulation, with the intention of promoting a more transparent, safe, and resilient global financial system.
　　第二，全球金融监管。为了解决危机的根源，20 国集团成员国承诺彻底改革全球金融监管，让全球金融体系更透明、更安全和更具抵御能力。
　　Most notably, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was created in 2009 with a mandate to develop and promote effective financial regulation. Significant progress has been made in terms of strengthening system-wide oversight, increasing capital and liquidity buffers, promoting the exchange of financial information, and implementing macroprudential policy frameworks. Efforts are also underway to facilitate cross-border resolution.
　　最值得注意的是，2009 年创立了金融稳定委员会，其任务是制定和推广有效的金融监管。在加强全系统监督、增加资本和流动性缓冲、促进金融信息交流、实施宏观审慎政策框架方面取得了显著进展。还在努力推动跨境破产解决工作。
　　Yet major challenges remain, such as ending the too-big-to-fail problem, reforming shadow banking, and making derivatives markets safer. In the euro area, recent policy actions have helped ease market stress, but more still needs to be done to reverse financial fragmentation and move towards a full banking union.
　　然而，仍存在重大挑战，如解决太大不能倒闭的问题、改革影子银行，并让衍生产品市场更加安全。在欧元区，最近的政策行动帮助缓解了市场压力，但还需去除金融分割，实现全面的银行联盟。
　　Third, strengthening regional and global safety nets. To mitigate the impact of the crisis, countries came together to strengthen the global financial safety net, including by trebling the size of the IMF’s resources and increasing the allocation of SDRs. In Europe, the financial architecture of the euro area was enhanced through the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) framework. In other parts of the world, commitments to regional financing arrangements, such as the Chang Mai Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Community Anti-crisis Fund, were reinforced.
　　第三，加强区域和全球安全网。为减轻危机的影响，各国联合加强全球金融安全网，包括让基金组织的资源规模增加两倍和提高特别提款权分配。在欧洲，通过建立欧洲稳定机制（ESM ）和欧洲央行的直接货币交易框架（ OMT ），欧元区的金融架构加强。在世界其他地区，对区域性融资安排，如“清迈倡议”和“欧亚经济共同体反危机基金”的承诺都得到增强。
　　However, progress has been uneven in other areas. For example, in the case of the IMF, the agreement reached in 2010 on important quota and governance reforms that would further increase the voice and representation of emerging market and developing economies has not yet been implemented. While two of three required conditions have been fulfilled, further support is needed to meet the final condition that will allow the reform to take effect.
　　然而，其他领域的进展不均平衡。例如，就基金组织而言，2010 年就重要的份额和治理改革达成的协议尚未实施，这些改革将进一步提高新兴市场和发展中经济体的发言权和代表性。虽然三个必要条件中的两项已得到满足，要使改革生效，还需得到进一步支持，以满足最后一个条件。
　　If we put all this together, the report card on global governance reform since the crisis is somewhat mixed. Policymakers across the globe need to keep the momentum alive and seize the opportunity to advance governance reform while memories of the crisis and the sense of urgency remain fresh. Indeed, there is a real danger that the window of opportunity for addressing some of the most challenging global issues might soon be closing. How can this trend be reversed and important reforms finalized? To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the different types of solutions that have evolved as means to deliver global public goods.
　　如果我们把这一切综合在一起，危机之后的全球治理改革成绩单好坏参半。世界各地的政策制定者需要保持势头，抓住机遇，趁对危机尚记忆犹新和改革迫切感尚存，推进治理改革。事实上，解决最具挑战性的全球性问题的窗口可能很快就会消失，这种危险是存在的。如何扭转此趋势并落实重要改革？要回答这个问题，让我们看看已经演变成提供全球公共产品手段的各种不同解决方案，也许会有所助益。
　　Soft versus hard policy coordination
　　软和硬政策协调
　　In what direction is the global system of economic governance and policy coordination evolving? To answer this question, I find it instructive to differentiate between “hard” and “soft” governance and policy coordination.
　　经济治理和政策协调的全球体系在朝哪个方向发展？要回答这个问题，我觉得区分 “硬”和“软”的治理及政策协调会有帮助。
　　“Hard” policy coordination is typified by quid pro quos in policies with a focus on specific and tangible outcomes. Examples include the two initial G20 Leaders’ Summits that took place in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and resulted in the coordinated fiscal policy response I mentioned earlier and the creation of the FSB.
　　典型的“硬”政策协调是通过采取政策，以获得具体和切实的成果。例子包括 20 国集团领导人在危机之后立即召开的两次峰会，成果是前面所提到的协调的财政政策和创建FSB。
　　In contrast, “softer” forms of coordination are more process-based without a priori expectation of substantial outcomes or agreements. They are designed to facilitate the exchange of views and information sharing on an ongoing basis, such as the regular discussions among central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
　　相反， “软”协调更加注重于程序，对实质结果或协议没有先验期望。目的是持续基础进意见和信息共享，如央行在国际清算定期举行讨论。
　　Soft and hard policy coordination can complement each other. For instance, soft arrangements can keep the policy dialogue alive during quiet times, and provide a framework for harder cooperation, and even full-fledged policy coordination, during crises.
　　软的和硬的政策协调可以互为补充。例如，软安排可以在和平时期保持政策对话，并为硬合作提供合作框架，甚至是在危机期间提供全面的政策协调。
　　Soft versus hard governance
　　软和硬治理
　　A parallel argument can be made for governance. “Hard” governance arrangements require the establishment of legal obligations and independent institutions through treaties. The UN, IMF, World Bank and the WTO typify such arrangements.
　　治理也有同样。“硬的”治理安排要求通过制定条约建立法律义务和独立机构。联合国、基金组织、世界银行和世界贸易组织即是这类安排。
　　On the positive side, this kind of hard, treaty-based architecture strengthens the credibility of member countries’ commitments and grants legal enforcement powers to institutions. However, their establishment and adaptation to changing circumstances tends to be a relatively slow-moving process, which can be a problem when the global environment or the needs of members change.
　　从积极的一面看，这类硬的以条约为基础的架构可提高成员国承诺的可信性，并赋予执法机构权力。然而，其建立和适应不断变化的形势往往需要一个较缓慢的过程，当全球环境或成员国的需要发生变化时，可能会是一个问题。
　　“Soft” governance arrangements, such as the G20 and BRIC country groupings, the FSB, or the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have no international legal personality or obligations. As a result, they tend to be more flexible and can often be put in place more quickly. They do not, however, have treaty-based mandates or legal enforcement powers. As a result, they have a more limited ability to enforce commitments, which can pose challenges for their relevance and effectiveness over time.
　　“软的”治理安排，如 20 国集团和金砖四国集团、FSB 或金融行动特别工作组（FATF ）不具备国际法律地位或义务。因此，它们往往更灵活，通常可以更快地建立。但是，它们没有基于条约的授权或执法权力。结果，它们强制执行承诺的能力更有限，随着时间推移，这会给其相关性和有效性带来挑战。
　　Finally, there are, of course, also private sector solutions to governance challenges. One example are Collective Action Clauses (CACs) which allow a supermajority of bondholders to agree to changes in bond payments terms, with the intention of facilitating smoother debt restructuring. Another example is IFRS, an independent nonprofit foundation that promotes the harmonization of global accounting standards.
　　最后，当然，解决治理挑战还有私营部门解决方案。其中一个例子是“集体行动条款”，该条款允许在绝对多数债权人同意的情况下变更债券支付条款，以促进债务顺利重组。另一个例子是国际财务报告准则，这是一个独立的非营利基金会，旨在促进全球会计标准的统一。
　　A mosaic of solutions
　　各种解决方案
　　In sum, the global economic governance structure of the future may well be a mosaic—or ecosystem—of “hard” and “soft” elements that operate in a complementary fashion. In such a system, governance arrangements would essentially be issues- and context-driven, with choices between hard and soft governance arrangements depending on what is the most efficient and practical solution to regulate and oversee a specific matter at hand. Making such a system “smart” depends crucially on using hard or soft governance at the right time and for the right issues.
　　总之，未来的全球经济治理结构可能会是一种组合或生态系统，由“硬”和“软”两种元素组成。在这样的系统中，治理安排将基本上由问题和环境驱动，采用针对特定事件的规范和监督，将根据最有效和最实用的解决方案作为原则来决定选择硬的或软的治理安排。制作这样一个“智能”系统关键取决于在正确的时间和对正确的问题选择使用硬的或是软的治理。
　　Let’s consider three examples of how hard and soft governance have been combined:
　　让我们来通过三个例子来考虑如何结合使用软的和硬的治理：
　　First, take trade. We all prefer multilateral trade agreements over regional ones. Since the gains from trade are well recognized, the WTO dispute resolution process has real “teeth” with an ability to impose sanctions on those who violate global trade rules. Increasingly mega-regional agreements (like US-EU or TPP) are less about tariffs but about standards and non-tariff barriers. To the extent that they help set global norms that facilitate trade, they bring us closer to more global solutions and potentially reinforce (and in the future possibly become integrated with) the WTO framework.
　　首先，以贸易为例。相比区域贸易协定，我们都比较喜欢多边贸易协定。从贸易得到的好处显而易见，WTO 的争端解决过程具备真正的“牙齿”，有能力对违反全球贸易规则的国家实施制裁。很少的大型区域协定（如美国-欧盟或 TPP）是针对关税的，它们针对标准和非关税壁垒。只要它们能帮助建立国际准则，促进贸易，就会让我们更接近球性解决方案，并可能加强世界贸易组织框架（将来还可能成为WTO 的一部分）。
　　Second, consider the balance between hard and soft governance in the euro area crisis. Arguably the hard governance came from the IMF and the ECB and soft governance from the Eurogroup. Europe’s complex governance arrangements worked well in peace time, but decision making processes were not well suited to managing crisis.
　　其次，在欧元区危机中考虑软硬治理之间的平衡。可以说，硬治理来自基金组织和欧洲央行，软治理来自欧洲集团。欧洲复杂的治理安排在和平时期运作良好，但其决策过程不适于管理危机。
　　Finally consider the areas of financial regulation. As part of its mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the IMF conducts financial stability assessments every 5 years of jurisdictions that have systemically important financial sectors. Mandatory FSAPs are a good example of hard surveillance where countries are assessed against compliance with clear global standards and stress tested against national and international spillovers. Every two years after an FSAP, the FSB does a peer review (a sort of soft governance) of follow up on FSAP recommendations as a complementary way to advance key reforms for financial stability.
　　最后，考虑金融监管的范畴。作为强制性金融部门评估规划（FSAP ）的一部分，基金组织每 5 年对具有系统重要性的金融部门的管辖区进行评估。强制性金融部门评估规划是硬监督的一个很好的例子，该规划对有关成员国遵守明确国际标准的情况进行评估，并根据国内和国际溢出效应进行压力测试。金融部门评估规划之后每两年，FSB 进行同行检查（是一种软治理），跟踪成员国采纳金融部门评估规划所提重大改革建议的情况，这些建议是推进重点改革的一种补充。
　　However, a flexible and efficient global governance structure may not emerge automatically. For example, when “hard” global institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO adapt too slowly to changes in their environment, governance gaps will open up.
　　然而，灵活和高效的全球治理结构不会自动出现。例如，当“硬的”全球性机构，如基金组织、世界银行和世界贸易组织适应变化环境的速度太慢，就会出现治理空白。
　　“Softer” institutions may step in to fill these gaps, but as substitutes rather than playing a complementary role. This would not be efficient and could leave us with a weaker global governance system.
　　“软”机构可能介入，填补空白，作为替代，而不是发挥补充作用。这不会是有效的，而且可能留给我们的是一个更弱的全球治理体系。
　　The case for IMF governance reform
　　基金组织进行治理改革的原因
　　This brings me to a final point. In the evolving ecosystem of global governance and policy coordination that I described, it is essential for the elements of “hard” governance to stay relevant by adapting to changes in the world economy.
　　最后一点。在我所描述的不断变化的球治理和政策协调的生态系统中，让“硬”治理因素适应世界经济变化，保持与时俱进是必不可少的。
　　Over the years, the IMF has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adjust its work and operations in response to major changes in the global economy, including the fall of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
　　多年来，基金组织已经表现出非凡的能力调整其工作和业务，以应对全球经济的重大变化，包括 20 世纪 70 年代初固定汇率制度崩溃，20 世纪 80 年代的债务危机，以及1991 年苏联解体。
　　The key reason why the IMF has remained relevant has been a political governance structure that, albeit slowly, does adapt to changes in the world economy. It also has an independent staff, and a constitution (in the form of our Articles of Agreement) that allows the Fund to adopt a longer-term perspective. Moreover, the IMF has, in some aspects, also managed to internally integrate hard elements of governance such as mandatory surveillance, with softer elements, such as voluntary Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes or facilitation of standards for sovereign wealth funds. On the “softer” side, the Fund’s consensus-based decision-making has been effective at ensuring that member countries’ points of view are being heard.
　　基金组织为何一直保持相关性的关键原因是，其政治治理结构在不断适应世界经济的变化，尽管速度缓慢。基金组织具有独立的工作人员和宪法（以协议的形式），这使得基金组织可以采取长远视角。此外，基金组织还在某些方面设法在内部整合治理的硬因素（如强制性监督）和软因素，如标准和守则遵守情况的自愿报告，或推动制定权财富基金标准。在“软”因素一面，基金组织以共识为基础的决策一直有效地确保可以听取所有成员国的观点。
　　Going forward, it will be crucial for the IMF’s effectiveness and legitimacy to ensure that its governance structure reflects the relative position of its member countries in the global economy. Approval of the 2010 reforms would be an important step in this direction, although further shifts in quota and voting shares to dynamic economies will also be needed.
　　展望未来，确保基金组织的治理结构反映成员国在全球经济中的相对地位对于基金组织保持其有效性和合法性至关重要。批准 2010 年的改革将是朝此方向迈出的重要一步，当然还需要向有活力的经济体进一步转移份额和投票权。
　　To achieve this, some countries will have to accept relative declines in their quota and voting shares. Understandably, for them this will not be an easy decision, but in return they will help ensure that the Fund can continue to remain strong and legitimate for the benefit of the entire membership—and the global economy.
　　要实现这一点，一些国家必须接受其份额和投票权相对下降。对于这些国家来说这不是一个容易的决定，这是可以理解的，但是作为回报，这将帮助确保基金组织能继续保持强劲和合法，这符合所有成员国和全球经济的利益。
　　Conclusion
　　结论
　　While significant efforts to improve global economic governance were made in the initial phase of the crisis, the momentum of reform and policy coordination has slowed recently.
　　在危机的初期阶段，为改善全球经济治理，各国作出巨大努力；近来，改革和政策协调的势头有所放缓。
　　Indeed, while the current system is able to deliver governance and policy coordination when there is a lot to lose—such as in a crisis, it is much less effective in galvanizing action when there is potential for mutual gain—such as global economic rebalancing.
　　事实上，尽管目前的系统在危难时刻，如在危机中可以提供治理和政策协调，但是，如果出现潜在的相互增益，如全球经济再平衡的情况，则难以有效地采取行动。
　　One possible explanation is that the global community tends to rally in a time of crisis when the time horizon is short and immediate costs are high. However, in normal times, gathering momentum for action today may be hard because the cost of inaction lies far in the future.
　　一个可能的解释是，国际社会往往在危机时刻，在时间短暂，成本很高的情况下齐心协力。然而，在正常时期，如当今情况下，聚集力量采取行动可能很难，因为不采取行动的代价只会在遥远的将来发生。
　　Some observers point toward plurilateralism and the rise of soft global governance as a threat to the traditional pillars of hard global governance, including the IMF. I am much less pessimistic. I see these two forms of governance as potential complements rather than imperfect substitutes. Soft governance works when innovation is needed but there is time to act, when getting a subset of countries to act is sufficient and ad hoc implementation can work. Hard governance is needed in a crisis or when global approaches are needed and when consistent enforcement is key.
　　一些观察家认为多向性和软全球治理的兴起是对硬的全球治理，包括基金组织等传统支柱的威胁。我不这么悲观。我认为这两种形式的治理可以相互补充，而不是相互替代。当需要创新，一组国家采取行动就足够，而且可以临时实施时，软治理会奏效。在危机期间或需要全球性解决办法，而且必须一致实施时，需要硬治理。
　　So, coming back full circle to Martin Wolf’s call for extraordinary creativity in seeking solutions to the multitude of challenges faced by the world today, I believe we can tackle the issues by being smart about the governance we need, and by making the most of political opportunity when it presents itself. By integrating “soft” and “hard” governance more intelligently, better outcomes can be achieved for everyone, small and large countries alike.
　　回到 Martin Wolf 呼吁寻求非凡的创造力，以解决当今世界面临的众多挑战问题，我认为，我们可以通过采用智能治理办法，充分利用所有的政治机会来解决这些问题。通过更好地结合“软”和“硬”治理，每个国家，无论大小，都可以取得更好的结果。
　　I am grateful to Andreas Bauer, Sanjaya Panth, Niklas Westelius, Camilla Andersen and Dustin Smith for their help in preparing this speech and to Olivier Blanchard, Sean Hagan, and Jose Vi?als for their thoughtful comments.
　　感谢 Andreas Bauer,、Sanjaya Panth、 Niklas Westelius、 Camilla Andersen 和 Dustin Smith 为此演讲稿所做的准备工作，并感谢 Olivier Blanchard, Sean Hagan, and Jose Vi?als 提出的深思熟虑的意见。

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