蒂尔堡——

　　美国总统奥巴马获得连任后，几乎立刻将注意力转向了控制美国节节攀升的国民债务的问题。事实上，几乎所有西方国家都在实施旨在减少公债规模的政策，至少不能再让公债继续上升。

　　在他们广为引用的《债务时代的增长》（GrowthinaTimeofDebt）中，肯尼斯·罗格夫（KennethRogoff）和卡门·莱因哈特（CarmenReinhart）指出，当政府债务突破GDP的90%时，国家就会遭受经济增长减速。许多西方国家的国民债务距离这一门槛已相当接近，不少国家更是已经超出。

　　事实上，根据经合组织的数据，到今年年底，美国国民债务/GDP比率将攀升至108.6%。欧元区公债水平将达到GDP的99.1%，其中法国的公债/GDP比率将达到105.55。英国的公债/GDP比率将为104.2%。即使最守纪律的德国预计也将逼近90%的门槛，达到88.5%。

　　各国可以通过降低预算赤字或实现基本盈余（财政余额减去存量债务的利息）降低国民债务水平。要达到这一目标，可以通过增税、削减政府支出、加快经济增长或以上三者的结合实现。

　　当经济开始增长时，自动稳定器就会发生魔力。随着更多的人开始工作挣钱，纳税额会上升，申领失业救济等政府福利者会减少。收入增加和支出减少双管齐下，预算赤字就会开始降低。

　　但在经济增长缓慢的时期，决策者的选择范围极其有限。增税不但会为民众所反对；同时也不利于生产，因为许多国家的税负已经相当高了。对支出削减的民众支持也很难胜出。结果，许多西方决策者只能寻找替代方案——其中很多可以归类为金融抑制。

　　当政府采取措施将自由市场条件下会流向他处的资金引导到自己手中时，金融抑制就发生了。比如，许多政府实施了银行和保险公司监管，增加了后两者所持有的政府债务数量。

　　考虑巴塞尔III国际银行标准。巴塞尔III规定银行不必为AA-及以上信用级别的政府债券投资拔备现金。此外，投资母国政府发行的债券也不要求缓冲资金，不管评级如何。

　　与此同时，西方各大央行在使用另一种金融抑制--维持实际利率为负（收益率低于通胀率），这让它们能够免费地维持债务。欧洲央行的政策利率维持在0.75%，而欧元区年通货膨胀率为2.5%。类似地，英格兰银行政策利率只有0.5%，而其通货膨胀率在2%以上。在美国，通胀率也超过2%，而美联储的基准联邦基金利率仍维持在0-0.15%的历史低点。

　　此外，由于欧洲央行、英格兰银行和美联储正在涉足资本市场--美国和英国以“量化宽松”（QE）的方式，欧元区的欧洲央行以“直接货币交易”（OMT）的方式--长期真实利率也呈现出负水平（美国30年期真实利率虽然为正，但比零高不了多少）。

　　这些措施诱导而非强迫银行投资于政府债券，属于“软”金融抑制。但政府可以超越这些手段，要求金融机构维持或增持政府债务，2009年英国金融服务局便如此做过。

　　类似地，2011年，西班牙银行的政府贷款数量增加了将近15%，而与此同时，私人部门贷款量在减少，西班牙政府的信誉也在走下坡路。一位意大利银行业资深人士曾说，意大利银行会被财政部追杀，如果它们胆敢出售所持有的政府债务的话。某葡萄牙银行家也说，尽管银行应该减少其高风险政府债务敞口，政府却在强迫他们买入更多。

　　此外，在许多国家（包括法国、爱尔兰和葡萄牙），为了给财政赤字融资，政府还把手伸向了养老基金。英国也即将采取类似措施，“允许”地方政府养老基金投资基础设施项目。

　　曾几何时，直接或间接的货币融资被视为央行最大的犯罪之一。QE和OMT无非是披着新衣的老罪行。这类央行政策与巴塞尔III一道，意味着金融抑制至少将在未来十年继续决定经济图景。


　西尔维斯特·艾伊芬格（SylvesterEijffinger）是荷兰蒂尔堡大学金融经济学教授，艾丁·穆加吉克（EdinMujagic）是蒂尔堡大学货币经济学家

Eijffinger/Mujagic:The Age of Financial Repression

By Sylvester Eijffinger and Edin Mujagic

TILBURG - Following his re-election, US President Barack Obama almost immediately turned his attention to reining in America's rising national debt. In fact, almost all Western countries are implementing policies aimed at reducing - or at least arresting the growth of - the volume of public debt.

In their widely cited paper "Growth in a Time of Debt," Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart argue that, when government debt exceeds 90% of GDP, countries suffer slower economic growth. Many Western countries' national debt is now dangerously near, and in some cases above, this critical threshold.

Indeed, according to the OECD, by the end of this year, America's national debt/GDP ratio will climb to 108.6%. Public debt in the eurozone stands at 99.1% of GDP, led by France, where the ratio is expected to reach 105.5%, and the United Kingdom, where it will reach 104.2%. Even well disciplined Germany is expected to close in on the 90% threshold, at 88.5%.

Countries can reduce their national debt by narrowing the budget deficit or achieving a primary surplus (the fiscal balance minus interest payments on outstanding debt). This can be accomplished through tax increases, government-spending cuts, faster economic growth, or some combination of these components.

When the economy is growing, automatic stabilizers work their magic. As more people work and earn more money, tax liabilities rise and eligibility for government benefits like unemployment insurance falls. With higher revenues and lower payouts, the budget deficit diminishes.

But in times of slow economic growth, policymakers' options are grim. Increasing taxes is not only unpopular; it can be counter-productive, given already-high taxation in many countries. Public support for spending cuts is also difficult to win. As a result, many Western policymakers are seeking alternative solutions - many of which can be classified as financial repression.

Financial repression occurs when governments take measures to channel to themselves funds that, in a deregulated market, would go elsewhere. For example, many governments have implemented regulations for banks and insurance companies that increase the amount of government debt that they own.

Consider the Basel III international banking standards. Among other things, Basel III stipulates that banks do not have to set aside cash against their investments in government bonds with ratings of AA- or higher. Moreover, investments in bonds issued by their home governments require no buffer, regardless of the rating.

Meanwhile, Western central banks are using another kind of financial repression by maintaining negative real interest rates (yielding less than the rate of inflation), which enables them to service their debt for free. The European Central Bank's policy rate stands at 0.75%, while the eurozone's annual inflation rate is 2.5%. Likewise, the Bank of England keeps its policy rate at only 0.5%, despite an inflation rate that hovers above 2%. And, in the United States, where inflation exceeds 2%, the Federal Reserve's benchmark federal funds rate remains at an historic low of 0-0.25%.

Moreover, given that the ECB, the Bank of England, and the Fed are venturing into capital markets - via quantitative easing (QE) in the US and the UK, and the ECB's "outright monetary transactions" (OMT) program in the eurozone - long-term real interest rates are also negative (the real 30-year interest rate in the US is positive, but barely).

Such tactics, in which banks are nudged, not coerced, into investing in government debt, constitute "soft" financial repression. But governments can go beyond such methods, demanding that financial institutions maintain or increase their holdings of government debt, as the UK's Financial Service Authority did in 2009.

Similarly, in 2011, Spanish banks increased their lending to the government by almost 15%, even though private-sector lending contracted and the Spanish government became less creditworthy. A senior Italian banker once said that Italian banks would be hanged by the Ministry of Finance if they sold any of their government-debt holdings. And a Portuguese banker declared that, while banks should reduce their exposure to risky government bonds, government pressure to buy more was overwhelming.

In addition, in many countries, including France, Ireland, and Portugal, governments have raided pension funds in order to finance their budget deficits. The UK is poised to take similar action, "allowing" local government pension funds to invest in infrastructure projects.

Direct or indirect monetary financing of budget deficits used to rank among the gravest sins that a central bank could commit. QE and OMT are simply new incarnations of this old transgression. Such central-bank policies, together with Basel III, mean that financial repression will likely define the economic landscape for at least another decade.

Sylvester Eijffinger is Professor of Financial Economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. Edin Mujagic is a monetary economist at Tilburg University.

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