斯坦福——

　　政治领导人交接通常要么意味着变化，要么意味着持续。但交接非此即彼的前景通常会阻碍重要的政治决策，冻结某些经济活动，让相伴而生的不确定性迟迟得不到解决。

　　以中共十八大为高潮的中国十年一度的领导人交接便是如此。尽管在很多人的记忆中，中国领导人交接只会带来政治和文化上的好奇，而对世界各大国经济不会造成多少直接影响，但这早就是老黄历了。

　　如今，中国是世界第二大经济体，尽管最近的年GDP增长下降到了7%，仍比其他大国表现出色。中国仍是包括电脑和手机在内的众多制造品的全球供给链关键组装中心，让全世界消费者得以享受低价。这让中国成为美国、大部分欧洲国家和许多其他经济体的关键贸易伙伴，更是亚洲内部贸易和供给动态链的中心。

　　此外，由于近几十年来的大规模贸易盈余，中国坐拥着约3.3万亿美元外汇储备，大部分是美元，也有其他主要货币。这笔外汇储备有助于融通其他国家的贸易赤字和国内投资（许多受益国有着大规模的预算赤字，导致国民储蓄低于国内投资）。

　　邓小平的改革点燃了人类历史上最快速的经济进步，随之而来的大批并不断增加的中产阶级。这使中国成为众多外国企业的重要市场机会——包括汽车制造商、技术供应商、金融机构、能源公司和农业出口商。各行业（特别是能源业）中资企业——通常是国有企业——也在寻求更大的海外投资机会。

　　中国的惊人增长的一个副产品是与其他国家的经济紧张日渐加剧。中国的汇率政策及其对美国的双边贸易盈余是美国总统大选的重要议题，关于中国外部投资的担忧也无处不在。世界贸易组织支持美国对中国轮胎的关税，加拿大延长了对中海油收购该国石油和天然气生产商尼克森公司（Nexen）的审查。尽管中国加入了世贸组织，但许多外国公司仍面临在中国扩张的诸多限制，或是必须与中国公司合作才行。

　　中国人也对某些外国人的贸易行为不满，并将一些案例上诉至世贸组织（比如与欧盟的旷日持久的太阳能面板争端），其他国家针对中国的案例在不断增加。但是，各方都必须明白，中国对世界经济和贸易体系来说太重要了，以至于这些争论绝不可以形成不可收拾之势。

　　与此同时，中国的经济减速——拜全球疲软、控制通胀和压抑过热资产市场的措施所赐——正在拖累就业岗位的创造，而中国每年需要创造数百万新工作岗位来让不断扩张的城市地区从贫困的农村走向更大的繁荣。而这一过程正逢前主席江泽民和前总理朱镕基的市场开放和减少国家控制政策节奏放慢之时。

　　因此，即将上任的主席习近平和总理李克强受到了广泛的关注，千百双眼睛盯着他们将会如何做。很少有继任者——不管是企业还是政府——会明目张胆地剥夺即将卸任、已无实权的现任领导人的地位，因此没人可以打包票说新领导人会让改革更进一步还是会寻求维持现状。

　　除了新主席和新总理，中国还诞生了其他新政治局常委，大量部长级职位有待任命。中国高级领导人有着“不上即退”的制度，得不到提拔者将被取代。从新任中国人民银行行长到新国务委员和最高监管者，新领导集体有机会通过促进竞争、抑制国有企业实力、提振家庭消费、减少出口依赖让中国更进一步。

　　今年早些时候，国务院中国发展研究中心和世界银行发布了一份出色的报告，阐述了中国政策日程所面临的机会和挑战。报告的结论是，中国需要完成其土地、劳动力、金融和企事业单位改革的市场经济转型。开放市场以引入更多竞争以及重新平衡政府和市场的关系是在未来几十年中步入高收入行列方面最重要的战略。对习近平和李克强来说，很难找到比这更好的为中国经济政策打上自己烙印的框架了。

　　特别是，以国际标准衡量或与其他处于类似发展阶段的国家的历史经验相比，中国消费占GDP的比重非常低。两个提升消费的重要选择是社会保障——这方面有所进步，但进步太慢——以及通过向公民发放红利减少国有企业的巨额存款，正如民营企业向股东发放红利那样。

　　在当下和未来数年中，受困于各自经济问题的世界各国的管理者、工人、消费者、投资者和政府都会因中国新领导人的明智改革方案而大大受惠。世界很快就会知道该期待什么。
 

 
Michael J. Boskin:A New Agenda for China's New Leaders?
 

By Michael J. Boskin

STANFORD - Political leadership transitions typically signal either a change in direction or continuity. But the mere prospect of such a transition usually postpones some important political decisions and freezes some economic activity, pending the resolution of the accompanying uncertainty.

China's decennial leadership transition, culminating at the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Congress, is a case in point. And, while many will remember when a Chinese leadership transition was a political and cultural curiosity that had few direct economic implications for the world's major powers, those days are long gone.

China is now the world's second-largest economy, and, despite a recent slowdown to 7% annual GDP growth, it is outperforming all other major players. It remains the vital assembly center of the global supply chain for many manufactured goods, such as computers and cell phones, enabling lower prices for the world's consumers. That has made China a key trade partner for the United States, most European countries, and many other economies, in addition to placing it at the center of intra-Asian trade and supply-chain dynamics.

Moreover, China sits on roughly $3.3 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves - much of it in dollars, but also in other major currencies - owing to its large trade surplus in recent decades. It helps to finance other countries' trade deficits and domestic investment (many of its beneficiaries have large budget deficits that decrease national saving below domestic investment).

Deng Xiaoping's reforms ignited the most rapid economic improvement in human history and, with it, the emergence of a large and growing middle class. That makes China an important market opportunity for a broad range of foreign firms - including car producers, technology suppliers, financial institutions, energy companies, and agricultural exporters. And Chinese firms - too often state-owned - are seeking greater investment opportunities abroad in major industries, particularly energy.

A byproduct of China's spectacular growth has been rising economic tensions with other countries. China's exchange-rate policy and its bilateral trade surplus with the US were major issues in America's presidential election, and concerns over Chinese foreign investment are ubiquitous. The World Trade Organization upheld America's duties on Chinese tires, and Canada has extended its review of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation's bid to acquire Nexen, a Canadian oil and gas producer. Despite China's WTO membership, many foreign companies face restrictions on expanding in China or must cooperate with a Chinese company.

The Chinese, for their part, complain about foreign trade practices and are taking some cases (for example, a long-running dispute with the European Union over solar panels) to the WTO, where cases brought against China by other countries are proliferating. All sides, however, must bear in mind that China is too important to the global economy and trading system to allow these disputes to spin out of control.

Meanwhile, China's economic slowdown - the result of global weakness and efforts to cool the country's inflation and overheated asset markets - threatens to slow the pace of job creation for the millions moving annually from rural poverty to greater prosperity in China's expanding urban areas. And it comes at a time when the pace of market opening and reduction of state control has slowed, following substantial reforms under former President Jiang Zemin and former Premier Zhu Rongji. While outgoing President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao struck reformist chords in public statements and in China's 12th Five-Year Plan, many inside China - including, reportedly, Jiang - are disappointed.

Thus, incoming President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang are being watched closely for signs of what they will do. It is rare for a successor - in business or government - to usurp the current leader's lame-duck status by tipping his hand, so no one can yet say with any certainty whether the new leadership will push for a reformist leap forward or seek to maintain the status quo.

In addition to a new president and premier, other members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo have been named and a vast array of ministerial positions are being filled. With China's "up or out" system for senior leaders, those who are not promoted will be replaced. From the new governor of the People's Bank of China to the cabinet and leading regulators, the new cohort has an opportunity to move China forward by promoting competition, decreasing the power of state enterprises, boosting household consumption, and reducing reliance on exports.

Earlier this year, the China Development Research Center of the State Council and the World Bank issued an excellent report on opportunities for, and challenges to, China's policy agenda. They concluded that China should complete its transition to a market economy with land, labor, financial, and enterprise reforms. Opening markets to greater competition and rebalancing the roles of government and markets is the most promising strategy to achieve high-income status in the coming decades. It would be hard to find a better framework for Xi and Li as they put their imprint on China's economic policy.

In particular, Chinese consumption as a share of GDP is very low by international standards and relative to the historical experience of other countries at a similar stage of development. Two important options for raising consumption are social insurance - which is developing, but too slowly - and reducing state-owned enterprises' huge savings by paying dividends to citizens, much as privately owned companies routinely pay dividends to shareholders.

Managers, workers, consumers, investors, and governments in every corner of the world, many reeling from their own economic problems, have a lot riding on China's new leadership navigating reform sensibly, now and in years to come. The world will soon know more about what to expect.

Michael Boskin, Professor of Economics at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, was Chairman of George H. W. Bush's Council of Economic Advisers from 1989-93.

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