诗歌翻译:孙武·《孙子兵法--虚实篇》英文译文

小编导读：《孙子兵法--虚实篇》是春秋末年的齐国人孙武的作品。虚实篇是《孙子兵法》的第六篇，本篇以"避实而击虚"一语为全篇的主脑，而以"致人而不致于人"为转变虚实的关键。同时，又用"先"、"后"、"劳"、"佚"四个字，点明入手的途径和所得的后果。意在教人要占敌机先，争取主动；切戒落后，陷于被动。篇中虽变幻诡谲，不可方物，但核其要旨，不外乎反复申明争取主动，陷敌被动，藉以达避实击虚，"兵不顿而利可全"的战略目的。

《孙子兵法---虚实篇》

孙子曰：

凡先处战地而待敌者佚，后处战地而趋战者劳。故善战者，致人而不致于人。能使敌人自至者，利之也；能使敌人不得至者，害之也。故敌佚能劳之，饱能饥之，安能动之。出其所必趋，趋其所不意。

行千里而不劳者，行于无人之地也；攻而必取者，攻其所不守也；守而必固者，守其所不攻也。故善攻者，敌不知其所守；善守者，敌不知其所攻。

微乎微乎，至于无形；神乎神乎，至于无声，故能为敌之司命。进而不可御者，冲其虚也；退而不可追者，速而不可及也。故我欲战，敌虽高垒深沟，不得不与我战者，攻其所必救也；我不欲战，画地而守之，敌不得与我战者，乖其所之也。

故形人而我无形，则我专而敌分；我专为一，敌分为十，是以十攻其一也。则我众而敌寡，能以众击寡者，是吾之所与战者，约矣。吾所与战之地不可知，不可知则敌所备者多，敌所备者多，则吾所与战者寡矣。故备前则后寡，备后则前寡，备左则右寡，备右则左寡，无所不备则无所不寡。寡者备人者也，众者使人备己者也。

故知战之地，知战之日，则可千里而会战。不知战之地，不知战日，则左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救后，后不能救前，而况远者数十里，近者数里乎？以吾度之，越人之兵虽多，亦奚益于胜则哉？故曰：胜可为也。敌虽众，可使无斗。

故策之而知得失之计，作之而知动静之理，形之而知死生之地，角之而知有余不足之处。故形兵之极，至于无形；无形则深间不能窥，智者不能谋。因形而错胜于众，众不能知；人皆知我所以胜之形，而莫知吾所以制胜之形；故其战胜不复，而应形于无穷。

夫兵形象水，水之行避高而趋下，兵之形避实而击虚；水因地而制流，兵因敌而制胜。故兵无常势，水无常形。能因敌变化而取胜者，谓之神。故五行无常胜，四时无常位，日有短长，月有死生。

Void and Actuality

Sun WU

Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease, and he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. One able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to stop him from coming does so by preventing him. Thus, when the enemy is at ease be able to tire him, when well fed to starve him, when at rest to make him move.

Appear at places which he is unable to rescue; move swiftly in a direction where you are least expected.

That you may march a thousand li without tiring yourself is because you travel where there is no enemy. To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not or cannot protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy dares not or is not able to attack. Therefore, against those skilled in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend, and against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack.

How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no trace. How divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible. Thus, he is master of his enemy's fate. His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for his enemy's weak positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws if he moves swiftly. When I wish o give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself simply be drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes.

If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while, at the same time, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate my forces and his must be divided. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. Therefore, I will be numerically superior. Then, if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will fall into hopeless straits. The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in will be few. For if he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable, and if his right, there will be few troops on his left. And when he sends troops everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. Numerical weakness comes from having to guard against possible attacks; numerical strength from forcing the enemy to make these preparations against us.

If one knows where and when a battle will be fought, his troops can march a thousand li and meet on the field. But if one knows neither the battleground nor the day of battle, the left will be unable to aid the right and the right will be unable to aid the left, and the van will be unable to support the rear and the rear, the van. How much more is this so when separated by several tens of li or, indeed, be even a few! Although I estimate the troops of Yüe as many, of what benefit is this superiority with respect to the outcome of war? Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging.

Therefore, analyze the enemy's plans so that you will know his shortcomings as well as strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient. The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to conceal them without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is according to the situations that plans are laid for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands how the victory is achieved. Therefore, when a victory is won, one's tactics are not repeated. One should always respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.

Now, an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and strike weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant conditions. Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Of the five elements [water, fire, metal, wood, and earth], none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. That is also the law of employing troops.

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